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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we examine the role of information sharing and borrower legal rights in 
affecting the procyclical effect of bank loan loss provisions. Based on a sample of Asian 
banks, our empirical results highlight that higher non-discretionary provisions reduce 
loan growth and hence, non-discretionary provisions are procyclical. A closer 
investigation suggests that better information sharing through public credit registries 
managed by central banks, but not private credit bureaus managed by the private sector, 
might substitute the role of a dynamic provisioning system in mitigating the 
procyclicality of non-discretionary provisions. We also document that higher 
discretionary provisions in countries with stronger legal rights of borrowers may temper 
the procyclical effect of non-discretionary provisions. However, these findings only hold 
for small banks. This suggests that the implementation of a dynamic provisioning system 
to mitigate the procyclicality of non-discretionary provisions is more crucial for large 
banks, because such procyclicality cannot be offset by strengthening credit market 
environments through better information sharing and legal rights of borrowers. 
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1. Introduction 
During the last three decades, financial crises in both developed and developing 
countries were mostly preceded by strong macroeconomic performance in an 
environment with poor bank risk management (e.g., the 1980 US saving and loan crisis, 
the 1994/1995 Mexican crisis, the 1997/1998 Asian crisis, the 1998 Russian crisis, and 
the 2008 credit crisis that led to a prolonged global economic downturn). Such 
developments suggest the increasing need for a sound credit risk management in banking 
to limit the riskiness of banks and prevent a procyclical effect during economic 
downturns. The procyclical effect of credit risk management mainly occurs due to the 
fact that banks tend to underestimate credit risk during cyclical upturns, but overestimate 
it during cyclical downturns (Altman, 2005). Consequently, these actions reduce loan 
availability and deepen economic recessions.  
Likewise, overcoming the procyclicality of bank credit risk management has become 
one of the key issues in the new Basel Accords, particularly related to bank capital 
regulation. Meanwhile, studies of banks’ procyclical behavior have been conducted 
through two major research avenues. The first strand of literature focuses on the impact 
of macroeconomic fluctuations on bank capital buffers to examine whether capital 
buffers are procyclical over the business cycle. In this regard, banks are substantially 
required to fulfill minimum capital adequacy ratios in order to cope with credit risk. 
Since capital requirements are based on risk, banks tend to increase capital buffers and 
reduce loans during a cyclical downturn when impaired loans materialize. The second 
strand of literature explores the effect of macroeconomic fluctuations on loan loss 
provisions and how provisioning affects bank lending behavior.  
In spite of a growing literature focusing on the first strand (e.g., Ayuso et al., 2004; 
Borio et al,. 2001; Estrella, 2004; Jokipii and Milne, 2008), very limited attention has 
been given to the second strand of research, particularly regarding the link between loan 
loss provisions and bank lending. Several studies highlight the presence of the 
procyclicality of loan loss provisions over the business cycle (e.g. Laeven and Majnoni, 
2003; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; Craig et al., 2006), but only Bouvatier and Lepetit 
(2008) and Bouvatier and Lepetit (2012) assess how provisioning affects bank lending. 
While Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) focus on European banks, Bouvatier and Lepetit 
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(2012) extend their previous study by incorporating a sample of banks from emerging 
markets. By partitioning loan loss provisions into discretionary and non-discretionary 
loan loss provisions, Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) document that non-discretionary loan 
loss provisions exacerbate a procyclical effect because higher non-discretionary 
provisions reduce bank loan growth. In contrast, discretionary loan loss provisions – 
particularly related to income smoothing behavior – have no significant impact on bank 
loan growth. In this sense, the adoption of a dynamic provisioning system is desirable, 
because it allows banks to generate higher statistical provisions under a dynamic 
provisioning systems to complement discretionary provisions, which cannot directly 
offset the procyclical effect of non-discretionary loan loss provisions. Moreover, 
Bouvatier and Lepetit (2012) further document that the procyclicality of non-
discretionary loan loss provisions in banking is more pronounced in emerging markets. 
In parallel, another strand of literature advocates greater information sharing 
activities to strengthen financial intermediation. Higher lending activities and lower 
credit risk can be observed in countries where public and private credit bureaus are of 
better quality (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002). Love and Mylenko (2003) also highlight the 
role of private credit bureaus and public credit registries in reducing firms’ financing 
constraints. Specifically, private credit bureaus have greater contribution than public 
credit to alleviate firms’ financing constraints. Brown et al. (2009) also document that 
higher information sharing increases bank lending through a reduction in intermediation 
cost. Houston et al. (2010) further find that stronger creditor legal rights are associated 
with higher economic growth. Against this backdrop, our contribution is twofold.  
Firstly, given that better information sharing and legal rights might strengthen 
financial intermediation, this paper is the first to explore whether information sharing and 
strength of borrower legal rights can mitigate the procyclicality of bank loan loss 
provisions. Hence, we highlight whether the adoption of a dynamic provisioning system 
can be substituted by better credit information sharing and borrower legal rights. 
Secondly, we specifically assess whether the procyclicality of loan loss provisions, as 
well as the role of information sharing and legal rights in affecting such procyclicality, 
differs between large and small banks. Bank size is an important dimension in bank credit 
risk management because large banks are more prone to be “too big to fail” and to have 
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moral hazard problems (Mishkin, 2006; Kane, 2000). During economic boom periods, 
large banks can arguably generate lower loan loss provisions to anticipate unexpected 
credit risk, because they believe that the government can rescue them in case of failure. 
As such, the role of bank size in affecting the procyclicality of loan loss provisions 
warrants further examination. 
To assess these issues, we focus on emerging markets in Asia for at least three 
reasons. First, bank credit is the predominant source of financing for private sector 
businesses in Asian countries and, therefore, unsound credit risk management in banking 
can exacerbate financial disintermediation during a cyclical downturn (Adams, 2008; 
Angkomkliew et al., 2009). Second, conflicts of interest between bank regulators and 
investors are also apparent in Asian banks when banks rely on loan loss reserves to cope 
with credit risks. Agusman et al. (2009) document that higher loan loss reserves reduce 
bank stock returns. In other words, bank regulations related to loan loss reserves and 
provisioning are subject to conflicts of interest between investors and bank regulators, at 
least in the Asian context. Hence, assessing the issue of loan loss provisions in Asian 
banks is relevant to examine how bank regulations and investors’ interests might be 
harmonized, particularly regarding the adoption of a dynamic provisioning system that 
increases loan loss provisions during economic boom periods. Third, the loan loss 
provisioning system varies across Asian countries. Although the procyclicality of loan 
loss provisions became a major issue after the 1997 crisis, the implementation of the 
dynamic provisioning system are still limited in Asian countries.
1
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing 
literature on the use of loan loss provisions for bank credit risk management and its 
implications. Section 3 describes our data and research method. Section 4 discusses our 
empirical results and presents the robustness checks, while Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Related review of literature and research focus 
Banks focus on the use of loan loss provisions as a prudential device to manage 
credit risk. However, loan loss provisions can be procyclical with the business cycle 
                                                 
1
   See Angklomkliew et al. (2009) for further discussion on the current loan loss provisioning system in 
various Asian countries in order to respond the 1997/1998 financial crisis.  
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because loans are likely to default during a cyclical downturn. This, in turn, increases 
banks’ risk aversion that boosts loan loss provisions (Altman, 2005). From an accounting 
perspective, there are two types of provisions for bank credit risk: specific and general 
provisions (Cortavaria et al., 2000). While specific provisions address identified impaired 
loans through an increase in loan loss reserves, general provisions are associated with a 
broad assessment of possible future losses on the entire bank portfolio. As banks need to 
estimate general provisions, such provisions may be influenced by subjective judgements 
related to managers’ discretionary behavior.  
The literature documents that general provisions can be further partitioned into non-
discretionary and discretionary components. On the one hand, non-discretionary 
provisions cover expected credit risks and are considered as a backward-looking 
component (Whalen, 1994; Beaver and Engel, 1996). On the other hand, the discretionary 
component is associated with the use of loan loss provisions for managerial objectives. 
Specifically, the discretionary component is linked to three discretionary actions 
comprising capital management, income smoothing and signalling (Ahmed et al., 1999; 
Lobo and Yang, 2001; Kanagaretnam et al., 2003, 2004 & 2005; Anandarajan et al., 
2007; Hasan and Wall, 2004). 
The Basel definition of capital has emphasized that part of general provisions counts 
as capital. When loan losses are excessive during a cyclical downturn, increases in 
specific provisions can be inadequate to cover expected loan losses. Such loan losses can 
erode bank capital and may, in turn, adversely affect banks’ incentive to grant new loans, 
exacerbating a cyclical downturn. This situation is often referred to as “capital crunch” 
and has been documented in the literature related to bank capital requirements (e.g., 
Bernanke and Lown, 1991; Peek and Rosengren, 1995).  
Prior studies have documented that the bank provisioning system is procyclical in 
general. Laeven and Majnoni (2003) point out that the procyclicality of loan loss 
provisions can be shown by a negative impact on loan loss provisions of higher loan 
growth, economic growth, or earnings. In a cross-country setting, Cavallo and Majnoni 
(2002) also find a negative link between economic growth and loan loss provisions. 
Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) document similar evidence for OECD countries. In a 
single country setting, Arpa et al. (2001) document the procyclicality of bank loan loss 
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provisions over the business cycle in Austria, while Fernandez de Lis et al. (2001) and 
Pain (2003) document similar results for Spanish and UK banks, respectively. Only 
Packer and Zhu (2012), Angklomkliew et al. (2009) and Craig et al. (2006) focus on 
Asian banks and, again, report identical results. Nevertheless, to the best of our 
knowledge, no prior research examines how loan loss provisions affect bank lending 
behavior in the Asian context. 
Another strand of literature advocates a sound provisioning system in any regulations 
on bank capital requirements (Cavallo and Majnoni, 2002; Banque de France, 2001). This 
is because a sound provisioning system can avoid credit risk miscalculation in a cyclical 
downturn due to disaster myopia (Guttentag and Herring, 1984), herd behavior (Rajan, 
1994), or institutional memory hypothesis (Berger and Udell, 2003). Fernandez de Lis et 
al. (2001) propose a dynamic or statistical provisioning system that may solve 
procyclicality issues for Spanish banks. The statistical provisions are not intended to 
substitute a specific provision, but to complement the loan loss provisioning system. 
Specific and general provisions are estimated in line with traditional procedures, while 
the statistical provisions are calculated from the difference between expected loan losses 
and specific provisions (Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008).  
As the statistical provisions are estimated to anticipate risks due to business cycle 
fluctuations, the statistical provisions tend to increase during a cyclical upturn to 
anticipate a cyclical downturn in the future. Although the statistical provisions increase in 
a cyclical downturn, the funds obtained from “reserves” generated by the statistical 
provisions in the earlier period of economic boom can smooth bank profits and losses. 
Consequently, incorporating the statistical provisions into a bank provisioning system can 
mitigate banks’ incentives to grant new loans when expected credit risks are 
underestimated, particularly during a cyclical upturn. As long as banks can improve 
credit risk evaluation and profit management in their provisioning system, Borio et al. 
(2001), Mann and Michael (2002), and Jiménez and Saurina (2005) support Fernandez de 
Lis et al.’s (2001) contention that the procyclicality of bank loan provisions can be 
resolved. 
In order to assess the importance of implementing a dynamic provisioning system for 
European countries such as Spain, Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) examine the impact of 
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non-discretionary and discretionary provisions on bank loan growth in several stages. In 
the first stage, they examine the determinants of bank loan loss provisions (LLP). In 
doing so, they create a LLP model in which loan loss provisions are regressed on 
backward-looking indicators related to problem loans (e.g., non-performing loans, loan-
to-asset ratio, and annual GDP growth), and forward-looking indicators depicting capital 
management, income smoothing and signalling activities of banks. In the second stage, 
bank loan loss provisions are subsequently grouped into discretionary and non-
discretionary components. The discretionary component is computed as the fitted values 
of the LLP model in which forward-looking indicators become explanatory variables. In 
parallel, the non-discretionary component is computed as the fitted values of the LLP 
model in which backward-looking indicators become explanatory variables. In the third 
stage, they create a regression model to examine the impact of estimated discretionary 
and non-discretionary provisions on bank loan growth. They show that non-discretionary 
provisions negatively affect bank loan growth, while discretionary provisions have no 
statistically significant impact on bank loan growth. Hence, only non-discretionary 
provisions exacerbate the procyclical effect of loan loss provisions over the business 
cycle.  
Building on their previous study, Bouvatier and Lepetit (2012) modify the procedure 
to estimate non-discretionary provisions by incorporating an indicator of income 
smoothing. They argue that loan loss provisions might be used to smooth income as part 
of bank discretionary behavior, and this behavior might be important to offset a negative 
impact of non-discretionary provisions on bank loan growth. Their empirical results 
reveal that greater income smoothing only tempers the negative impact of non-
discretionary provisions on bank loan growth, but such a negative impact remains 
apparent. In this regard, the use of a statistical provision or a dynamic provisioning 
system is desirable because greater income smoothing is not enough to mitigate the 
procyclicality of non-discretionary provisions.  
Despite the importance of a dynamic provisioning system, different characteristics of 
banks (such as bank size) may determine a bank’s capacity to implement a dynamic 
provisioning system. Similarly, each country also has different macroeconomic and 
institutional environments and, thus, the capacity to adopt a dynamic provisioning system 
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may vary substantially from one country to another. For such reasons, the current study is 
the first to extend prior research on the link between loan loss provisions and bank 
lending behavior by considering bank size to account for bank-specific characteristics, as 
well as information sharing and legal rights to account for country-specific factors. 
Information sharing and legal rights are relevant because the issues of financial 
intermediation are conditional on the extent to which information systems and legal rights 
are of better quality (e.g., Jappelli and Pagano, 2002; Love and Mylenko, 2003; Brown et 
al., 2009; Houston et al., 2010).  
With regards to the influence of legal rights on the link between loan loss provisions 
and bank loan growth, we consider the influence of the legal rights of borrowers instead 
of creditor legal rights as in Houston et al. (2010), because we examine the impact of loan 
loss provisions on bank loan growth from the demand side. Arguably, stronger legal 
rights of borrowers may increase borrowers’ confidence in the banking sector. This in 
turn reduces the procyclical effect of loan loss provisions on bank loan growth, 
particularly during economic downturns.  
Although we divide loan loss provisions into discretionary and non-discretionary 
components, our method differs from Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008 and 2012). 
Specifically, we do not distinguish the type of discretionary purposes, i.e., whether 
income smoothing, capital management or signalling purposes. In this sense, we allow 
for different types of discretionary behavior to simultaneously offset the procyclicality of 
non-discretionary provisions, rather than focusing merely on the use of income 
smoothing as emphasized in Bouvatier and Lepetit (2012). We therefore follow 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2009) in grouping loan loss provisions into discretionary and non-
discretionary provisions, which is explained in the next section.  
 
3. Data, methodology and econometric specifications 
3.1. Data source  
From BankScope Fitch IBCA, we construct an unbalanced panel of annual bank-
level data from 528 commercial banks in 11 countries in the Asia-Pacific region covering 
the 2002-2012 period. These countries include China (153), Hong Kong (39), India (60), 
Indonesia (72), Malaysia (31), South Korea (17), Taiwan (38), Thailand (18), Pakistan 
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(23), Philippines (31), and Vietnam (46).
2
 Moreover, we incorporate country-specific 
data such as real gross domestic product (RGDP) and short-term interest rate (SHRATE) 
retrieved from Thomson Reuters Datastream International.  
As this study also assesses the influence of credit information sharing and legal 
rights of borrowers on the link between loan loss provisions and bank lending, we also 
retrieve data country-level data regarding credit reporting system and legal rights strength 
for each country. These data are collected from the Doing Business database provided by 
the World Bank. Doing Business 2004-2014 provides data on a country’s credit reporting 
system for January 2003 to January2013. Hence, such information reflects the situation at 
the end of each year from 2002 to 2012.  
To account for the quality of credit information sharing, we consider the degree of 
credit information covered by private credit bureau (PRIVBUR) and public credit registry 
(PUBREG) following Tsai et al. (2011). PRIVBUR and PUBREG describe the proportion 
of individuals and firms listed by a private credit bureau and a public credit registry, 
respectively. Information covered by these credit registries includes repayment history, 
unpaid debts and credit outstanding. Higher  PRIVBUR and PUBREG are associated with 
better credit information sharing.  
However, the information coverage of private credit bureaus is usually greater than 
that of public credit registries (Love and Mylenko, 2003). Private credit registries are 
more likely to collect information from various sources including non-bank creditors, and  
store more detailed information on the borrowers. On the other hand, public credit 
registries tend to collect information only from supervised institutions and the coverage 
of information is rather limited (Love and Mylenko, 2003).   
We also consider the legal rights strength index (LEGAL) from Doing Business 
2004-2014 to account for borrowers’ rights protection. Considering the influence of the 
legal rights of borrowers in examining the relation between loan loss provisions and bank 
loan growth is relevant for  the following reasons. It is widely perceived that stronger 
depositor protection through deposit insurance can  reduces incentives for depositors to 
discipline bank risk taking (Barth et al., 2006). Arguably, higher borrower protection may 
also exacerbate entrepreneurial moral hazard, particularly in the presence of information 
                                                 
2
 The numbers in parentheses represent the number of banks in our sample for each country. 
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asymmetry on the credit market. As the loan loss provisionining system is part of 
prudential regulations that aim to cope with bank credit risk, increased borrowers’ moral 
hazard due to stronger borrowers’ legal rights may cause risk-shifting from borrowers to 
banks a la Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). As such, the role of loan loss provisions in 
mitigating credit risk and procyclical effects can be outweighed by stronger legal rights 
for borrowers. On the other hand, Houston et al. (2010) emphasize that stronger 
protection of creditor rights is detrimental to financial stability, because it may increase 
incentives for creditors to undertake excessive risk taking. In this paper, we emphasize 
the strength of legal rights of borrowers and how it impacts the procyclical effect of loan 
loss provisions on growth in bank lending. To the best of our knowledge, no prior studies 
have examined how the legal rights of borrowers affect financial intermediation or 
stability.   
 
3.2. Method 
As stated earlier, the objective of our study is threefold. First, we examine the link 
between loan loss provisions and bank loan growth in order to highlight whether loan loss 
provisions are procyclical over the business cycle. Second, we examine whether 
information sharing and legal rights offset the procyclical effect of loan loss provisions, 
and substitute for the need for a dynamic provisioning system. Third, in examining these 
issues we consider the effect of bank size (i.e., large and small banks) to address the “too-
big-to-fail” issues related to bank risk taking through lending activities.  
In doing so, we initially identify the determinants of loan loss provisions for all 
banks. We then estimate discretionary and non-discretionary loan loss provisions. In the 
second step, we examine the effect of both discretionary and non-discretionary loan loss 
provisions on bank loan growth. In the third step, a closer investigation is undertaken to 
examine the influence of information sharing and legal rights on the link between loan 
loss provisions and loan growth in banking. Finally, in order to better understand the 
effect of bank size on these relationships, we repeat our tests for subsamples of large 
banks and small banks. These steps are explained further in the next section.  
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3.3. The determinants of bank loan loss provisions 
In order to disentangle the discretionary and non-discretionary components of the 
loan loss provisions, we initially estimate a loan loss provisions model with the ratio of 
loan loss provisions to total loans (LLPL) as the dependent variable following 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2009). We also use the ratio of total loan loss provisions to total 
assets (LLPTA) as the dependent variable in our tests. Specifically, we estimate the 
following equations: 
 
tititititi
tititititi
CHOFFTACHNPLNPLTAEBTPS
LLRTACHLOANCARTIERLLPL
,1,71,71,61,5
1,4,31,21,10, 1
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

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   (1a) 
 
tititititi
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LLRTACHLOANCARTIERLLPTA
,1,71,71,61,5
1,4,31,21,10, 1
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




   (1b) 
 
Eq. (1a) and Eq. (1b) represent the loan loss provision models for our two measures 
of loan loss provisions (LLPL and LLPTA). TIER1 is defined as Tier 1 risk adjusted 
capital, while CAR is total risk adjusted capital. CHLOAN denotes change in total 
outstanding loans and LLRTA is loan loss allowance. EBTPS reflects earnings before tax, 
loan loss provisions, and special items. NPL and CHNPL represent total non-performing 
loans and change in total non-performing loans, respectively. Finally, LCO represents net 
loan charge-offs (write-offs). Because we consider both listed and non-listed banks in our 
sample, all of these variables are scaled by bank total assets rather than market value of 
equity as in Kanagaretnam et al. (2009).  
We compute the estimated values of discretionary and non-discretionary provisions 
in period t based on either Eq. (1a) or Eq. (1b). We follow Kanagaretnam et al. (2009) 
where non-discretionary provisions in period t are calculated by the fitted values of the 
LLP equation, while discretionary provisions in period t are represented by the residuals 
of the LLP equation.  We specify NDISCL and NDISCTA to reflect the non-discretionary 
loan loss provisions estimated from the LLPL and LLPTA models in Eq. (1a) and Eq. 
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(1b), respectively. Likewise, DISCL and DISCTA are discretionary provisions calculated 
from the LLPL and LLPTA models, respectively. 
 
3.3. Bank loan loss provisions and loan growth 
 Once the estimated discretionary and non-discretionary provisions have been 
estimated, we assess the impact of non-discretionary and discretionary provisions on 
bank loan growth. Following Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008), bank loan growth (DLOAN) 
is defined as the actual change in the ratio of total loans to total assets. More precisely, 
bank loan growth is measured as: 
   1,,1,,, 5.0   tititititi TATALLDLOAN . 
L is total loans. To test for robustness, we also use the simple annual growth of total loans 
(LOANG) as the dependent variable. LOANG is calculated as the difference between total 
loans in period t and total loans in period t – 1, divided by total outstanding loans in 
period t – 1.  
Bank loan growth is regressed against our variables of interest and several control 
variables that may affect bank loan growth using the following equationsfollowing 
Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008): 
 
titititi
tititititi
SHRATELRGDPSIZE
DTAEQTANDISCDISCDLOAN
,,7,6,5
,4,3,2,10,




         (2a) 
titititi
tititititi
SHRATELRGDPSIZE
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,,7,6,5
,4,3,2,10,




         (2b) 
 
In Eq. (2a) and Eq. (2b), both DISC and NDISC are measured using either LLPL as 
in Eq. (1.a), or LLPTA as in the Eq. (1b).  
To control for bank-specific factors in Eq. (2a) and Eq. (2b), we include several 
bank-specific variables. The ratio of total equity to total assets (EQTA) is considered as a 
control variable, because higher capitalization is expected to enhance a bank’s capacity to 
grant new loans as described in the “capital crunch” literature (e.g.,  Bernanke and Lown, 
1991; Peek and Rosengren, 1995). Building on Olivero et al. (2011), we consider the 
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impact of bank liquidity and the “too-big-to-fail” effects on bank loan growth. However, 
we measure bank liquidity using the ratio of total deposits and short-term funding to total 
assets (DTA) instead of the ratio of liquid assets to total assets as in Olivero et al. (2011) 
due to data availability reasons. We expect a positive relation between DTA and loan 
growth because banks with a greater funding base have greater liquidity and more 
capacity to boost lending activities. Because larger banks tend to behave imprudently due 
to the “too-big-to-fail” effects (Beck and Laeven, 2006), larger banks might boost loan 
growth to generate profits. To account for bank size, we use the logarithm of bank total 
assets (SIZE).  
Given that our sample of banks comes from different countries, controlling for 
country-specific factors is necessary. Following Olivero et al. (2011), we include the 
logarithm of real gross domestic product (LRGDP) and short-term interest rate (SHRATE) 
to account for the degree of economic development and the impact of monetary policy, 
respectively. The role of monetary policy in bank lending has been widely discussed in 
which higher short-term interest rates can temper bank loan growth.  
 
3.4. Information sharing, legal rights of borrowers, and the procyclicality of loan loss 
provisions 
In the next stage, we augment the analysis by assessing whether the procyclicality of 
loan loss provisions is conditional on credit information sharing and strength of the legal 
rights of borrowers. Our focus is to examine the joint-impact of discretionary provisions 
and these country-specific factors. From these results, we can ascertain whether the 
procyclical effect of non-discretionary provisions, if any, can be offset by the 
countercyclical effect of discretionary provisions, which is also conditional on the extent 
to which credit information sharing and borrower legal rights are of better quality. In case 
that the countercyclical effect of discretionary provisions – which is dependent on the 
quality of credit information sharing and borrower legal rights – can offset the procyclical 
effect of non-discretionary loan loss provisions, then statistical provisions generated from 
a dynamic provisioning system might not be necessary.  
In examining the effect of information sharing on bank loan growth, we distinguish 
between the influence of private credit bureaus and public credit registries instead of 
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investigating the influence of information sharing in general following Brown et al. 
(2009). Our approach in defining information sharing therefore follows Tsai et al. (2011). 
This enables us to determine the type of information sharing mechanism that matters for 
economic growth and financial stability in overcoming the procyclicality of non-
discretionary loan loss provisions.  
For this purpose, we modify Eq. (2a) and Eq. (2b) to incorporate the interaction term 
between discretionary loan loss provisions and country-specific factors representing 
information sharing and borrower legal rights, as shown in Eq. (3), Eq. (4) and Eq. (5)
3
.  
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The above equations are also estimated using LOANG as an alternative measure of 
bank loan growth to replace DLOAN. Moreover, both DISC and NDISC also comprise 
two different measures depending on the definition of loan loss provisions as stated 
earlier, from Eq. (1a) and Eq. (1b). 
 
                                                 
3
 We interact each variable representing country-specific credit market environments (i.e. private credit 
bureaus, public credit registries, and borrower legal rights) with discretionary provisions instead of non-
discretionary provisions, because only discretionary provisions can be adjusted by bank managers for 
capital management, signaling, or income smoothing purposes. Arguably, credit market environments at 
the country level can affect the extent to which capital management, signaling or income smoothing plays a 
role, so that bank managers increases bank loan loss provisions. On the other hand, non-discretionary 
provisions cannot be easily adjusted due to credit market environments, because non-discretionary 
provisions are merely dependent on the degree of non-performing loans.  
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3.5. Information sharing, legal rights of borrowers, and the procyclicality of loan loss 
provisions: Large banks vs. small banks   
In the final step, we examine whether large banks and small banks behave differently 
in terms of their lending behavior in responding to higher loan loss provisions. In order to 
identify large banks and small banks, we calculate the average of the logarithm of total 
assets for each bank in the whole period of observation (2002-2012). We then use the 75
th
 
percentile of these average values as a cut-off point. A bank is considered a large bank if 
its average logarithm of total assets exceeds its 75
th
 percentile and a bank is considered a 
small bank if its average logarithm of total assets is less than its 75
th
 percentile. We 
construct a dummy variable (DSIZE), taking a value of 1 if a bank is classified as a large 
bank and 0 otherwise. In turn, we re-estimate Eq. (2a), Eq (2b), Eq. (3), Eq. (4), and Eq. 
(5) for large and small bank sample separately.   
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics and correlation structure 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of all variables used in this study. 
Descriptive statistics for all variables are also reported separately for large and small 
banks. The descriptive statistics indicate that small banks exhibit higher loan loss 
provisions on average (LLPTA and LLPL) than large banks. Small banks also exhibit 
higher average loan growth than large banks (DLOAN and LOANG). These initial 
observations highlight differences between small and large banks in terms of their 
lending behavior and procyclicality. Overall, all of the average values of bank-specific 
variables for small banks are higher than those for large banks.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
  
Table 2 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients for all bank-specific and country-
specific variables used in this study. The correlations suggest that multicollinearity is not 
likely to be an issue because none of the independent variables are highly correlated. 
 [Insert Table 2 here] 
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4.2. Regression results 
4.2.1. The determinants of bank loan loss provisions 
In this stage, we estimate Eq. (1) to obtain coefficients related to factors affecting 
bank loan loss provisions. Table 3 reports our estimation outputs. Non-performing loans 
(NPLTA), change in non-performing loans (CHNPL) and net loan charge-offs 
(CHOFFTA) are associated with higher loan loss provisions measured by both LLPTA 
and LLPL. Meanwhile, the Tier-1 capital ratio (RTIER1) has a significant and positive 
association with LLPTA but no significant association with LLPL.  Changes in total loans 
(CHLOAN) and loan loss reserves (LLRTA) have a negative association with both 
measures of loan loss provisions (LLPTA and LLPL). The negative association between 
CHLOAN and loan loss provisions (LLPTA and LLPL) indicates that loan loss provisions 
are procyclical because increased loan activities reflecting economic boom periods tend 
to reduce loan loss provisions. This finding is consistent with Asea and Blomberg (1998) 
and Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) who analyze US banks and European banks, 
respectively.  
However, Kanagaretnam et al. (2009) show that the coefficient of CHLOAN in the 
loan loss provision regression is positive, suggesting that banks in their sample behave 
prudently by building up loan loss provisions to cover default risk exposure following the 
expansion of lending activities. This also indicates that procyclicality of the loan loss 
provisioning system is less likely to occur in their bank sample.  
We also find that the earning variable (EBTPS) has no clear impact on loan loss 
provisions as reflected in a negative association with LLPTA while having a positive 
association with LLPL. This result asserts that banks in our sample tend to use loan loss 
provisions for non-discretionary purposes, particularly to deal with higher non-
performing loans and charge-offs. In other words, banks will increase loan loss 
provisions, because their expected credit risk also increase.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
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4.2.2. Bank loan loss provisions and loan growth 
In this section, we differentiate the effects of non-discretionary and discretionary 
loan loss provisions on bank lending. Specifically, we aim to assess what types of 
provisions amplify business cycle fluctuations through bank lending.   
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
The results reported in Table 4 indicate that only non-discretionary loan loss 
provisions amplify procyclical effects because higher non-discretionary loan loss 
provisions tend to reduce bank loan growth. This result is robust to our different 
measures of non-discretionary loan loss provisions and bank loan growth. The bank 
capital ratio (EQTA) is negatively linked to bank loan growth measured by LOANG, 
while the deposits-to-assets ratio (DTA) exhibits no significant association with bank loan 
growth. Bank size (SIZE) has a significant and positive association with bank loan 
growth. This follows the notion that bank risk taking – which might come from higher 
lending activities – increases due the “too-big-to-fail” effects, as the asset size of banks 
increases (Beck and Laeven, 2006; Mishkin, 2006; Kane, 2000).   
With regards to country-specific control variables, only short-term interest 
(SHRATE) is significant and it has a negative association with bank loan growth. This 
result suggests that the bank lending channel occurs in Asian banks following Olivero et 
al. (2011).  
 
4.2.3. Information sharing, legal rights of borrowers, and the procyclicality of loan loss 
provisions 
To test whether information sharing and borrower legal rights offset the procyclical 
effect of non-discretionary loan loss provisions, we estimate Eq. (3) to Eq. (5). Table 5 
presents our results when the effect of private credit bureaus is taken into consideration, 
while Tables 6 and 7 report our results regarding the influence of public credit registries 
and borrower legal rights, respectively.  
Consistent with our previous results, the results reported in Table 5 initially indicate 
that non-discretionary loan loss provisions exhibit a procyclical effect, because of the 
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negative link between non-discretionary provisions (NDISCTA and NDISCL) and bank 
loan growth (DLOAN and LOANG). This procyclical effect cannot be offset by 
discretionary provisions measured by DISCTA or DISCL, as discretionary provisions do 
not have a significant association with bank loan growth. In this respect, there is no 
countercyclical effect of discretionary provisions to offset the procyclicality of non-
discretionary provisions. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here]  
 
In the next turn, we examine the influence of information sharing measured by the 
quality of private credit bureaus (PRIVBUR) and public credit registries (PUBREG) on 
the link between discretionary provisions and loan growth. Our aim is to test whether the 
quality of information sharing  strengthens or deteriorates the countercyclical effect of   
discretionary provisions that may in turn offset the procyclicality of non-discretionary 
provisions.  
Table 5 documents the significant and negative interactions between discretionary 
loan loss provisions (DISCTA or and DISCL) and private credit bureaus (PRIVBUR). 
Moreover, we find that the negative coefficients of NDISCTA (or NDISCL) are higher 
than the sum of the coefficients of DISCTA (or DISCL) and DISCTA*PRIVBUR ( or 
DISCL*PRIVBUR). In this case, the presence of private credit bureaus is less beneficial 
to overcome the procyclicality  of loan loss provisions, because discretionary provisions 
also become procyclical. In other words, for countries with better private credit bureaus, 
the procyclicality of non-discretionary provisions  shown by the negative sign of 
NDISCTA or NDISCL is aggravated by the procyclicality of discretionary provisions. 
In contrast, the interaction terms between discretionary loan loss provisions (DISCTA 
and DISCL) and public credit registries (PUBREG) reported in Table 6 exhibit a positive 
and significant association with bank loan growth. Moreover, the sum of the coefficients 
of DISCTA (or DISCL) and such interaction terms are higher than the coefficients of non-
discretionary provisions (NDISCTA and NDISCL). Hence, higher discretionary  
provisions in countries with better public credit registries in sharing credit information 
might offset the procyclical impact of non-discretionary provisions on bank loan growth. 
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As such, a dynamic provisioning system to cope with the procyclicality of non-
discretionary provisions might be replaced by the role of public credit registries.  
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
In Table 7, we examine the effect of interaction terms between discretionary 
provisions (DISCTA or DISCL) and borrower legal rights (LEGAL) on bank loan growth. 
Meanwhile, higher discretionary provisions in countries with stronger legal rights of 
borrowers (DISCTA*LEGAL or DISCL*LEGAL) exhibit a positive impact on bank loan 
growth. However, the positive sign related to the sum of the coefficients of discretionary 
provisions and such interaction terms with borrower legal rights are smaller than the 
negative coefficients of non-discretionary provisions. Accordingly, stronger legal rights 
of borrowers combined with higher discretionary provisions can only temper the 
procyclicality of non-discretionary provisions on bank loan growth.  
  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
4.2.4. Information sharing, legal rights of borrowers, and the procyclicality of loan loss 
provisions: Large banks vs. small banks 
 
In this section, we differentiate the effect of information sharing and legal rights of 
borrowers on the procyclical impact of loan loss provisions with respect to bank size. 
Table 8 initially shows that both non-discretionary and discretionary loan loss provisions 
have a procyclical impact on bank lending for large banks, because both discretionary 
and non-discretionary provisions are negatively associated with bank loan growth. 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
In Table 9, we document that for large banks, the coefficients of the interaction terms 
between discretionary loan loss provisions and private credit bureaus (DISCL*PRIVBUR) 
are higher than the coefficients of discretionary loan loss provisions (DISCL). This 
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indicates that better private credit bureaus strengthen the positive impact of discretionary 
provisions on bank loan growth. In this regard, discretionary loan loss provisions for 
large banks are countercyclical, especially for countries with better private credit bureaus. 
Nevertheless, the countercyclicality of discretionary provisions in large banks cannot 
offset the procyclicality of non-discretionary provisions measured by NDISCL, because 
the negative coefficients of NDISCL are higher than the sum of the coefficients of DISCL 
and DISCL*PRIVBUR. 
 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
In Table 10, the coefficients for the interaction terms between discretionary loan loss 
provisions and public credit registries (DISCTA*PUBREG or DISCL*PUBREG) are not 
statistically significant for our sample of large banks. Whereas, both discretionary and 
non-discretionary provisions are negatively associated with bank loan growth. These 
results highlight that both types of provisions are procyclical, while such procyclical 
effects cannot be offset by the role of public credit registries.  
 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
 
In Table 11, we report that the degree of borrower legal rights has no significant 
effect on the procyclicality of loan loss provisions. We also find that both discretionary 
and non-discretionary provisions are procyclical. Overall, we find that the procyclicality 
of non-discretionary provisions for large banks cannot be offset by discretionary 
provisions or by the quality of private credit bureaus, private credit registries and 
borrower legal rights. For large banks, a dynamic provisioning system may be therefore 
necessary to increase statistical provisions in order to cope with the procyclicality of non-
discretionary provisions that amplify business cycle fluctuations.  
 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
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Moroever, Tables 12 to 15 report the results from re-estimating Eq. (2) to Eq. (5) for 
our sample of small banks. As reported in Table 12, only non-discretionary provisions 
(NDISCTA and NDISCL) have a significant and negative association with bank loan 
growth (DLOAN and LOANG). In Table 13, we document that higher information sharing 
by private credit bureaus exacerbates the procyclicality of non-discretionary provisions in 
small banks, because the sum of coefficients of the interaction terms (DISCTA*PRIVBUR 
and DISCL*PRIVBUR) and discretionary provisions (DISCTA and DISCL) are negative, 
increasing a negative magnitude of the coefficients of non-discretionary provisions. 
 
[Insert Table 12, 13, 14, and 15 here] 
 
Tables 14 and 15 present our results when we take into account the effect of public 
credit registries and borrower legal rights, respectively. We find strong evidence that 
better public credit registries and stronger borrower legal rights combined with higher 
discretionary provisions offset the procyclicality of non-discretionary loan loss 
provisions. On the whole, we find that using discretionary loan loss provisions is 
sufficient for small banks in countries with better quality public credit bureaus and 
stronger legal rights of borrowers, in order to offset the procyclicality of non-
discretionary loan loss provisions. In other words, a dynamic provisioning system that 
increases statistical provisions might not be crucial for small banks, if public credit 
registries and borrower legal rights are of better quality. Strengthening public credit 
registries and borrower legal rights might therefore be an option to cope with the 
procyclicality of non-discretionary provisions, instead of forcing small banks to 
implement a dynamic provisioning system.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This study examines the effect of loan loss provisions on the lending behavior of 
banks by considering the influence of credit information sharing and legal rights of 
borrowers. In general, we show that non-discretionary loan loss provisions of Asian 
banks are procyclical because higher non-discretionary loan loss provisions are 
significantly associated with a decline in bank loan growth. This procyclical effect for 
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non-discretionary loan loss provisions occurs in both large and small banks. For large 
banks, we also find that discretionary loan loss provisions exhibit a procyclical effect, as 
discretionary loan loss provisions in large banks are negatively associated with loan 
growth.   
Furthermore, we generally document that for all banks, credit information sharing 
and borrower legal rights may reduce the procyclicality of non-discretionary loan loss 
provisions. Specifically, higher discretionary loan loss provisions of banks in countries 
with better quality public credit registries (but not private credit bureaus) and stronger 
legal rights of borrowers may offset, or at least temper, the negative impact of non-
discretionary loan loss provisions on bank loan growth. However, these results only hold 
for our sample of small banks.  
In other words, we find evidence that small banks in countries with better public 
credit registries and stronger legal rights of borrowers can simply use discretionary loan 
loss provisions to offset the procyclicality of non-discretionary loan loss provisions. For 
small banks, higher discretionary loan loss provisions – combined with better quality 
public credit registries or borrower legal rights – are significantly associated with an 
increase in loan growth. This positive effect for discretionary loan loss provisions is 
greater than the negative effect of non-discretionary loan loss provisions on loan growth. 
Small banks in countries with better public credit registries and stronger legal rights of 
borrowers are the ones that do not require a dynamic provisioning system to overcome 
their procyclical behavior, although we do not discourage small banks from 
implementing a dynamic provisioning system.  
On the other hand, we do not find that high quality private credit bureaus, public 
credit registries, and legal rights of borrowers offset the procyclicality of non-
discretionary loan loss provisions in large banks. In this regard, the implementation of a 
dynamic provisioning system is iis more important for large banks than small banks. 
Hence, bank regulators need to pay closer attention to large banks with respect to the 
implementation of a dynamic provisioning system. This is because higher non-
discretionary loan loss provisions in large banks reduce loan growth and such a reduction 
cannot simply be offset by discretionary loan loss provisions, although the quality of 
credit information sharing and legal rights of borrowers are strengthened.  
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Overall, this study identifies conditions where a dynamic provisioning system may 
mitigate the procyclical behavior of Asian banks. This study is important in the sense that 
Asian banks do not all have the same capacity to implement a dynamic provisioning 
system. Similarly, the procyclical effect of loan loss provisions, notably the non-
discretionary provisions may vary from country to country depending on the strength of 
public credit registries and the legal rights of borrowers. In this respect, each country may 
have different macroeconomic environments, which, in turn, may determine the 
effectiveness of the dynamic provisioning system.   
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 Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variables 
All banks Large banks Small banks 
 Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev. 
Loan loss provisions 
   
  
  
  
  
LLPL 0.0081 0.0057 0.0316 0.0080 0.0055 0.0096 0.0081 0.0058 0.0365 
LLPTA 0.0049 0.0030 0.0232 0.0045 0.0031 0.0058 0.0050 0.0029 0.0268 
LLRTA 0.0196 0.0107 0.0521 0.0148 0.0096 0.0175 0.0214 0.0114 0.0597 
Capital adequacy ratios 
   
  
  
  
  
RTIER1 0.1636 0.1100 0.2594 10.3096 9.7250 3.3961 19.1613 11.9000 30.8939 
CAR 0.1931 0.1381 0.2483 0.1345 0.1308 0.0400 0.2172 0.1441 0.2905 
EQTA 0.1144 0.0789 0.1210 0.0680 0.0645 0.0274 0.1308 0.0898 0.1361 
Loan growth 
   
  
  
  
  
DLOAN 0.1013 0.0934 0.1214 0.0881 0.0870 0.0751 0.1061 0.0963 0.1341 
LOANG 0.2224 0.2035 0.2202 0.1871 0.1826 0.1571 0.2360 0.2123 0.2389 
CHLOAN 0.0856 0.0853 0.1065 0.0790 0.0802 0.0660 0.0881 0.0881 0.1178 
Non-performing loans   
 
  
  
  
   NPLTA 0.0256 0.0128 0.0438 0.0206 0.0097 0.0315 0.0276 0.0143 0.0476 
CHNPL -0.0413 -0.0080 1.9045 -0.1404 -0.0224 1.2089 -0.0009 -0.0005 2.1227 
CHOFFTA 0.0034 0.0012 0.0095 0.0034 0.0015 0.0068 0.0034 0.0010 0.0106 
Information sharing   
 
  
  
  
   PRIVBUR 0.1736 0.0000 0.3039 0.3161 0.1020 0.3805 0.1286 0.0000 0.2660 
PUBREG 0.1244 0.0080 0.1873 0.1344 0.0000 0.2511 0.1222 0.0460 0.1620 
Legal rights of borrowers   
 
  
  
  
   
LEGAL 0.0594 0.0500 0.0213 0.0626 0.0500 0.0235 0.0582 0.0500 0.0206 
Control variables   
 
  
  
  
   EBTPS 0.0180 0.0167 0.0275 0.0164 0.0157 0.0084 0.0186 0.0174 0.0317 
DTA 0.8115 0.8510 0.1410 0.8490 0.8681 0.0993 0.7981 0.8430 0.1509 
SIZE 15.1578 15.2605 1.9815 17.4306 17.1988 1.1503 14.3517 14.5815 1.5387 
LGDPR 13.1775 14.1097 2.0738 12.9685 13.3533 2.1604 13.2521 14.2056 2.0420 
SHRATE 0.0507 0.0390 0.0354 0.0361 0.0317 0.0245 0.0548 0.0447 0.0371 
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Table 2. Correlation coefficients 
 
Variables LLPL LLPTA DLOAN LOANG RTIER1 CAR CHLOAN LLRTA EBTPS NPLTA CHNPL 
LLPL 1.0000           
LLPTA 0.6447 1.0000          
DLOAN 0.0040 -0.0286 1.0000         
LOANG -0.0508 -0.0526 0.9048 1.0000        
RTIER1 -0.2496 -0.1030 -0.1284 -0.0138 1.0000       
CAR -0.2743 -0.1066 -0.1211 0.0088 0.9881 1.0000      
CHLOAN 0.0227 -0.0172 0.9484 0.8889 -0.1508 -0.1421 1.0000     
LLRTA 0.0416 0.0748 -0.1470 -0.1310 0.0885 0.0034 -0.1557 1.0000    
EBTPS 0.0732 -0.0049 -0.0161 0.0485 -0.0039 0.0300 -0.0015 0.0972 1.0000   
NPLTA 0.1560 0.1943 -0.1830 -0.1838 0.1109 -0.0264 -0.1856 0.7914 0.0318 1.0000  
CHNPL 0.2160 0.3658 0.0506 0.0285 -0.1082 -0.1456 0.0416 0.0483 -0.0889 0.1596 1.0000 
CHOFFTA 0.2802 0.1428 -0.1110 -0.0813 -0.0210 0.0376 -0.1010 0.1426 0.0783 0.1360 -0.3791 
EQTA -0.0878 -0.1289 -0.0852 -0.0093 0.6952 0.6788 -0.1346 0.0805 0.0799 0.1082 -0.1588 
DTA 0.0936 0.0650 0.1200 0.0445 -0.5589 -0.5395 0.1604 -0.1919 -0.1552 -0.1582 0.0623 
SIZE 0.0594 0.0263 -0.0622 -0.0908 -0.4222 -0.4282 -0.0195 -0.1696 -0.0220 -0.2379 0.0326 
LGDPR 0.0317 0.0392 -0.1029 -0.1584 0.0423 0.0420 -0.1142 0.1207 -0.0109 0.1587 0.0782 
SHRATE 0.0437 0.0315 0.0072 -0.0099 -0.1012 -0.0247 0.0075 0.0753 0.0750 0.0721 0.1337 
PRIVBUR -0.0217 -0.0139 -0.1961 -0.2193 0.1119 0.0893 -0.2013 -0.0579 -0.0907 -0.0954 -0.0239 
PUBREG -0.0845 -0.0159 0.0095 0.0230 0.0754 0.0735 0.0116 -0.1028 0.0110 -0.1660 0.0116 
LEGAL -0.0346 -0.0484 -0.0863 -0.0625 0.1226 0.1371 -0.1013 -0.0876 -0.0099 -0.1368 0.0058 
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Variables CHOFFTA EQTA DTA SIZE LGDPR SHRATE PRIVBUR PUBREG LEGAL 
CHOFFTA 1 
        EQTA 0.0531 1 
       DTA -0.0734 -0.8543 1 
      SIZE -0.0539 -0.5165 0.4206 1 
     LGDPR 0.0209 0.1384 -0.1808 -0.1740 1 
    SHRATE -0.0160 -0.0307 -0.0369 -0.1743 0.2476 1 
   PRIVBUR 0.0239 0.1388 -0.1336 0.0950 0.3118 -0.3852 1 
  PUBREG -0.1321 -0.0092 -0.0104 0.0817 0.0056 0.0713 0.0389 1 
 LEGAL -0.1258 0.1106 -0.1364 0.0063 0.1653 0.1149 0.4621 0.2961 1 
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Table 3. The determinants of loan loss provisions in banking 
Explanatory variables 
LLPTA LLPL 
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
 
    
  RTIER1(-1) 0.0343* 1.9605 -0.0027 -0.3402 
CAR(-1) -0.0115 -0.5596 -0.0371*** -3.9739 
CHLOAN -0.0212** -2.3828 -0.0114*** -2.8172 
LLRTA(-1) -1.1603*** -13.417 -0.2716*** -6.4866 
EBTPS -1.1700*** -15.0759 0.1728*** 4.3119 
NPLTA(-1) 0.3459*** 5.8196 0.2171*** 7.9951 
CHNPL 0.0104*** 17.2648 0.0047*** 16.1862 
CHOFFTA 1.4453*** 11.2494 0.8738*** 14.5973 
 
    
  Observations 1299 
 
1298   
R-squared 0.7089   0.3938 
 F-statistic 7.2331***   104.6929***   
Notes: DLOAN is the change in the ratio of total loans to total assets calculated from Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008). LOANG is the 
annual loan growth rate. DISCL and DISCTA represent discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the residuals of Eq. (1a) and 
Eq. (1b), respectively. NDISCL and NDISCTA represent non-discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the fitted values of Eq. 
(1a) and Eq. (1b), respectively. EQTA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. DTA is the ratio of deposits and short-term funds to 
total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. LGDPR is the logarithm of real gross domestic products. SHRATE is short-term 
interest rate proxied by the central bank policy rate. Estimations are carried out using Panel Least Squares controlling for both cross-
sectional and period fixed effects. *** indicates significant at the 1 percent level, while ** and * indicate significant at the 5 percent 
and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 4. Loan loss provisions and loan growth for all banks 
Explanatory variables 
DLOAN LOANG DLOAN LOANG 
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
 
    
  
    
  DISCTA -0.0299 -0.2471 -0.0936 -0.4024     
  NDISCTA -0.3032*** -2.7095 -0.5797*** -2.6704     
  DISCL     
  
-0.4718 -1.1127 -0.6834 -1.3709 
NDISCL     
  
-2.1512*** -3.7347 -4.1589*** -6.2076 
EQTA -0.2017 -1.1051 -0.4795* -1.7903 -0.1843 -0.8372 -0.4052 -1.5336 
DTA -0.0789 -0.8518 -0.1373 -0.8993 -0.1240 -1.1799 -0.1644 -1.0946 
SIZE 0.0711*** 3.8038 0.1004*** 3.4140 0.0806*** 3.5319 0.1163*** 3.9901 
LGDPR -0.0969 -1.5707 -0.0303 -0.2559 -0.1300 -1.6424 -0.0883 -0.7577 
SHRATE -1.0425*** -5.5349 -2.2065*** -6.0711 -1.0176*** -4.6068 -2.1692*** -6.0741 
 
    
  
    
  Observations 1298 
 
1272 
 
1297 
 
1271 
 R-squared 0.5807   0.5519 
 
0.5983   0.5674 
 F-statistic 4.1425***   3.5993***   4.4496***   3.8295***   
Notes: DLOAN is the change in the ratio of total loans to total assets calculated from Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008). LOANG is the 
annual loan growth rate. DISCL and DISCTA represent discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the residuals of Eq. (1a) and 
Eq. (1b), respectively. NDISCL and NDISCTA represent non-discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the fitted values of Eq. 
(1a) and Eq. (1b), respectively. EQTA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. DTA is the ratio of deposits and short-term funds to 
total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. LGDPR is the logarithm of real gross domestic products. SHRATE is short-term 
interest rate proxied by the central bank policy rate. Estimations are carried out using Panel Least Squares controlling for both cross-
sectional and period fixed effects. *** indicates significant at the 1 percent level, while ** and * indicate significant at the 5 percent 
and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 5. Loan loss provisions and loan growth for all banks: Do private credit bureaus matter? 
Explanatory variables 
DLOAN LOANG DLOAN LOANG 
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
 
    
  
    
  DISCTA 0.1128 0.8156 0.1546 0.6465     
  NDISCTA -0.3977*** -2.9725 -0.7574*** -2.7448     
  DISCL     
  
-0.1110 -0.3692 0.1077 0.1695 
NDISCL     
  
-2.1508*** -6.8336 -4.0790*** -6.0902 
EQTA -0.1698 -1.1329 -0.4619** -1.9873 -0.1762 -1.5080 -0.4125 -1.5484 
DTA -0.0537 -0.4989 -0.1133 -0.4561 -0.0899 -1.2377 -0.1423 -0.9247 
SIZE 0.0762*** 3.6855 0.1084** 2.5786 0.0843*** 5.9946 0.1254*** 4.2748 
LGDPR -0.0699 -0.8925 0.0013 0.0079 -0.1009* -1.7233 -0.0645 -0.5347 
SHRATE -1.0373*** -2.6429 -2.1887*** -2.6485 -1.0420*** -5.9289 -2.2129*** -6.1983 
PRIVBUR 0.0453 1.5816 0.0609 0.8408 0.0425** 2.0341 0.0511 1.1575 
DISCTA*PRIVBUR -1.3869* -1.6604 -2.6228** -1.7394     
  DISCL*PRIVBUR     
  
-1.4558* -1.8971 -3.3121** -2.0066 
 
    
  
    
  Observations 1298 
 
1272 
 
1297 
 
1271 
 R-squared 0.5847   0.5545 
 
0.6015   0.5699 
 F-statistic 4.1767***   3.6095***   4.4731***   3.8370***   
Notes: DLOAN is the change in the ratio of total loans to total assets calculated from Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008). LOANG is the 
annual loan growth rate. DISCL and DISCTA represent discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the residuals of Eq. (1a) and 
Eq. (1b), respectively. NDISCL and NDISCTA represent non-discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the fitted values of Eq. 
(1a) and Eq. (1b), respectively. EQTA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. DTA is the ratio of deposits and short-term funds to 
total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. LGDPR is the logarithm of real gross domestic products. SHRATE is short-term 
interest rate proxied by the central bank policy rate. PRIVBUR is the proportion of individuals and firms listed by a private credit 
bureau. Estimations are carried out using Panel Least Squares controlling for both cross-sectional and period fixed effects. *** 
indicates significant at the 1 percent level, while ** and * indicate significant at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 6. Loan loss provisions and loan growth for all banks: Do public credit registries matter? 
Explanatory variables 
DLOAN LOANG DLOAN LOANG 
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
 
    
  
    
  DISCTA -0.3619* -1.6632 -0.5826 -0.9283     
  NDISCTA -0.4567*** -3.4218 -0.8186*** -2.9803     
  DISCL     
  
-0.7819*** -2.7717 -1.1705** -2.0993 
NDISCL     
  
-2.1697*** -6.8640 -4.1665*** -4.8293 
EQTA -0.1885*** -1.6035 -0.4759*** -2.5399 -0.1813 -1.5697 -0.3919*** -2.9474 
DTA -0.0877 -1.2254 -0.1589 -0.6466 -0.1289* -1.8321 -0.1783 -0.7932 
SIZE 0.0782*** 5.3323 0.1124*** 2.6199 0.0841*** 5.8333 0.1241*** 3.3402 
LGDPR -0.0916 -1.5759 -0.0171 -0.0809 -0.1244** -2.1829 -0.0844 -0.3928 
SHRATE -1.0288*** -5.7241 -2.1857*** -2.6988 -1.0199*** -5.7944 -2.1686*** -2.8685 
PUBREG -0.0699 -1.4405 -0.1213 -0.8566 -0.0427 -0.8987 -0.0804 -0.5641 
DISCTA*PUBREG 2.1265** 1.8456 3.1589* 0.8874     
  DISCL*PUBREG     
  
3.5615** 2.0675 6.5730** 2.3258 
 
    
  
    
  Observations 1298 
 
1272 
 
1297 
 
1271 
 R-squared 0.5830   0.5533 
 
0.6004   0.5689 
 F-statistic 4.1478***   3.5909***   4.4522***   3.8213***   
Notes: DLOAN is the change in the ratio of total loans to total assets calculated from Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008). LOANG is the 
annual loan growth rate. DISCL and DISCTA represent discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the residuals of Eq. (1a) and 
Eq. (1b), respectively. NDISCL and NDISCTA represent non-discretionary loss provisions calculated from the fitted values of Eq. (1a) 
and Eq. (1b), respectively. EQTA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. DTA is the ratio of deposits and short-term funds to total 
assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. LGDPR is the logarithm of real gross domestic products. SHRATE is short-term interest 
rate proxied by the central bank policy rate. PUBREG is the proportion of individuals and firms listed by a public credit registry. 
Estimations are carried out using Panel Least Squares controlling for both cross-sectional and period fixed effects. *** indicates 
significant at the 1 percent level, while ** and * indicate significant at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 7. Loan loss provisions and loan growth for all banks: Do borrower legal rights matter? 
Explanatory variables 
DLOAN LOANG DLOAN LOANG 
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
 
    
  
    
  DISCTA -0.0389 -0.0713 -2.3017*** -2.7017     
  NDISCTA -0.2902*** -2.7208 -0.5031** -2.3780     
  DISCL     
  
-3.1598*** -7.7593 -8.1523*** -5.4426 
NDISCL     
  
-2.1996*** -6.8869 -4.2818*** -5.3143 
EQTA -0.1949* -1.6528 -0.4959** -2.4985 -0.1347 -1.3035 -0.4142*** -3.0302 
DTA -0.0838 -1.1665 -0.1304 -0.5398 -0.1176 -1.2358 -0.1537 -0.7339 
SIZE 0.0747*** 5.1287 0.1018** 2.4265 0.0796*** 4.1059 0.1146*** 2.8792 
LGDPR -0.1346** -2.0373 -0.0594 -0.2447 -0.1246 -1.1455 -0.0596 -0.2340 
SHRATE -1.0686*** -5.8972 -2.2395*** -2.8789 -1.0111*** -3.0959 -2.1220*** -2.9244 
LEGAL 0.0113 1.1724 0.0129 0.6954 0.0007 0.0691 -0.0052 -0.2542 
DISCTA*LEGAL 0.0019 0.0184 0.4251*** 2.8051     
  DISCL*LEGAL     
  
0.4829*** 5.8487 1.3854*** 5.3672 
 
    
  
    
  Observations 1298 
 
1272 
 
1297 
 
1271 
 R-squared 0.5813   0.5539 
 
0.6028   0.5738 
 F-statistic 4.1187***   3.5988***   4.4976***   3.8993***   
Notes: DLOAN is the change in the ratio of total loans to total assets calculated from Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008). LOANG is the 
annual loan growth rate. DISCL and DISCTA represent discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the residuals of Eq. (1a) and 
Eq. (1b), respectively. NDISCL and NDISCTA represent non-discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the fitted values of Eq. 
(1a) and Eq. (1b), respectively. EQTA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. DTA is the ratio of deposits and short-term funds to 
total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. LGDPR is the logarithm of real gross domestic products. SHRATE is short-term 
interest rate proxied by the central bank policy rate. LEGAL is the stength of borrowers legal rights developed by the Doing Business 
database. Estimations are carried out using Panel Least Squares controlling for both cross-sectional and period fixed effects. *** 
indicates significant at the 1 percent level, while ** and * indicate significant at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 8. Loan loss provisions and loan growth for large bank sample 
Explanatory variables 
DLOAN LOANG DLOAN LOANG 
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
 
    
  
    
  DISCTA -2.6547*** -3.6877 -4.7344*** -3.2464     
  NDISCTA -2.5661*** -3.7126 -4.5915*** -3.2917     
  DISCL     
  
-1.4626* -1.7393 -2.2603** -2.2973 
NDISCL     
  
-2.8158** -2.4237 -5.8621*** -4.3522 
EQTA -0.2059 -0.6861 0.5247 0.8489 -0.2901 -0.6302 0.2191 0.3538 
DTA -0.2049 -1.2825 -0.2259 -0.7057 -0.2296 -0.7712 -0.2656 -0.8406 
SIZE 0.1432*** 5.3932 0.1973*** 3.4568 0.1479*** 5.9142 0.2177*** 3.8657 
LGDPR -0.1479* -1.7953 -0.0601 -0.3540 -0.1441 -1.0707 -0.0650 -0.3879 
SHRATE -1.1256*** -3.4242 -2.3136*** -3.5221 -1.1818* -2.2693 -2.4619*** -3.7893 
 
    
  
    
  Observations 481 
 
478 
 
481 
 
478 
 R-squared 0.3037   0.3380 
 
0.3188   0.3544 
 F-statistic 2.9211***   3.2347***   3.0614***   3.4029***   
Notes: DLOAN is the change in the ratio of total loans to total assets calculated from Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008). LOANG is the 
annual loan growth rate. DISCL and DISCTA represent discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the residuals of Eq. (1a) and 
Eq. (1b), respectively. NDISCL and NDISCTA represent non-discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the fitted values of Eq. 
(1a) and Eq. (1b), respectively. EQTA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. DTA is the ratio of deposits and short-term funds to 
total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. LGDPR is the logarithm of real gross domestic products. SHRATE is short-term 
interest rate proxied by the central bank policy rate. Estimations are carried out using Panel Least Squares controlling for both cross-
sectional and period fixed effects. *** indicates significant at the 1 percent level, while ** and * indicate significant at the 5 percent 
and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 9. Loan loss provisions and loan growth for large bank sample: Do private credit bureaus matter? 
Explanatory variables 
DLOAN LOANG DLOAN LOANG 
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
 
    
  
    
  DISCTA -2.7338*** -3.5601 -4.7818*** -3.0670     
  NDISCTA -2.5161*** -3.6469 -4.5319*** -3.2390     
  DISCL     
  
-2.7393*** -3.3736 -6.1875*** -3.7755 
NDISCL     
  
-3.3731*** -4.7521 -7.6799*** -5.2858 
EQTA -0.1107 -0.3684 0.6119 0.9879 -0.1279 -0.4248 0.6346 1.0206 
DTA -0.2068 -1.2988 -0.2341 -0.7287 -0.2031 -1.2923 -0.1707 -0.5439 
SIZE 0.1459*** 5.5253 0.2075*** 3.6037 0.1519*** 5.8711 0.2272*** 4.0834 
LGDPR -0.0591 -0.6652 0.0450 0.2480 -0.0597 -0.6807 0.0394 0.2225 
SHRATE -1.2276*** -3.7335 -2.4454*** -3.7014 -1.1299*** -3.4171 -2.1129*** -3.1892 
PRIVBUR 0.1095** 2.5142 0.1484* 1.6659 0.1164*** 2.7162 0.1730** 1.9932 
DISCTA*PRIVBUR 0.8618 0.8274 0.9369 0.4044     
  DISCL*PRIVBUR     
  
3.8699** 2.0807 12.3646*** 3.0703 
 
    
  
    
  Observations 481 
 
478 
 
481 
 
478 
 R-squared 0.3130   0.3397 
 
0.3351   0.3727 
 F-statistic 2.9707***   3.2111***   3.1794***   3.5534***   
Notes: DLOAN is the change in the ratio of total loans to total assets calculated from Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008). LOANG is the 
annual loan growth rate. DISCL and DISCTA represent discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the residuals of Eq. (1a) and 
Eq. (1b), respectively. NDISCL and NDISCTA represent non-discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the fitted values of Eq. 
(1a) and Eq. (1b), respectively. EQTA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. DTA is the ratio of deposits and short-term funds to 
total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. LGDPR is the logarithm of real gross domestic products. SHRATE is short-term 
interest rate proxied by the central bank policy rate. PRIVBUR is the proportion of individuals and firms listed by a private credit 
bureau. Estimations are carried out using Panel Least Squares controlling for both cross-sectional and period fixed effects. *** 
indicates significant at the 1 percent level, while ** and * indicate significant at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 10. Loan loss provisions and loan growth for large bank sample: Do public credit registries matter? 
Explanatory variables 
DLOAN LOANG DLOAN LOANG 
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
 
    
  
    
  DISCTA -2.4464*** -3.5441 -4.8505*** -3.2048     
  NDISCTA -2.4715*** -5.2810 -4.4946*** -3.6715     
  DISCL     
  
-1.3760*** -2.7166 -2.2354** -2.1128 
NDISCL     
  
-2.7542*** -4.0707 -5.5879*** -4.0624 
EQTA -0.2309 -0.4939 0.3698 0.3376 -0.3210 -1.0737 0.1548 0.2515 
DTA -0.2824 -1.0146 -0.4088 -0.8586 -0.3026* -1.8840 -0.4299 -1.3413 
SIZE 0.1423*** 4.9985 0.1966** 2.4953 0.1478*** 5.6806 0.2158*** 3.8565 
LGDPR -0.0760 -0.5157 0.0569 0.1758 -0.0794 -0.9315 0.0691 0.3958 
SHRATE -1.0438** -2.0522 -2.1135** -2.0655 -1.0748*** -3.2857 -2.2530*** -3.4541 
PUBREG -0.1527** -2.0972 -0.3248*** -2.6401 -0.1483** -2.4489 -0.3157*** -2.6156 
DISCTA*PUBREG -1.7936 -0.3292 5.7263 1.1293     
  DISCL*PUBREG     
  
-2.4895 -0.6133 -1.7347 -0.2099 
 
    
  
    
  Observations 481 
 
478 
 
481 
 
478 
 R-squared 0.3122   0.3497 
 
0.3263   0.3628 
 F-statistic 2.9629***   3.3106***   3.0945***   3.4473***   
Notes: DLOAN is the change in the ratio of total loans to total assets calculated from Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008). LOANG is the 
annual loan growth rate. DISCL and DISCTA represent discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the residuals of Eq. (1a) and 
Eq. (1b), respectively. NDISCL and NDISCTA represent non-discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the fitted values of Eq. 
(1a) and Eq. (1b), respectively. EQTA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. DTA is the ratio of deposits and short-term funds to 
total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. LGDPR is the logarithm of real gross domestic products. SHRATE is short-term 
interest rate proxied by the central bank policy rate. PUBREG is the proportion of individuals and firms listed by a public credit 
registry. Estimations are carried out using Panel Least Squares controlling for both cross-sectional and period fixed effects. *** 
indicates significant at the 1 percent level, while ** and * indicate significant at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 11. Loan loss provisions and loan growth for large bank sample: Do borrower legal rights matter? 
Explanatory variables 
DLOAN LOANG DLOAN LOANG 
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
 
    
  
    
  DISCTA -2.2932*** -1.8412 -5.2622*** -2.7008     
  NDISCTA -2.5085*** -3.4616 -4.5227*** -3.3881     
  DISCL     
  
-2.7271 -1.1069 -6.1891 -1.3808 
NDISCL     
  
-2.7415*** -2.6865 -5.6859*** -2.6964 
EQTA -0.2001 -0.5666 0.4818 0.7184 -0.3004 -0.9499 0.1975 0.3338 
DTA -0.2131 -0.8130 -0.2269 -0.4743 -0.2347 -0.8808 -0.2698 -0.5504 
SIZE 0.1434*** 3.5939 0.1986** 2.3122 0.1498*** 3.8243 0.2223*** 2.6181 
LGDPR -0.1604 -1.5919 -0.0786 -0.4197 -0.1596 -1.5703 -0.0942 -0.4929 
SHRATE -1.1378*** -3.7820 -2.3347*** -3.8466 -1.1575*** -3.8925 -2.3722*** -3.9187 
LEGAL 0.4855 0.2998 0.5043 0.1573 0.2645 0.1644 0.2534 0.0799 
DISCTA*LEGAL -6.0469 -0.2828 12.0482 0.4142     
  DISCL*LEGAL     
  
24.9243 0.5191 76.4717 0.8891 
 
    
  
    
  Observations 481 
 
478 
 
481 
 
478 
 R-squared 0.3005   0.3348 
 
0.3167   0.3540 
 F-statistic 2.8576***   3.1627***   3.0041***   3.3549***   
Notes: DLOAN is the change in the ratio of total loans to total assets calculated from Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008). LOANG is the 
annual loan growth rate. DISCL and DISCTA represent discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the residuals of Eq. (1a) and 
Eq. (1b), respectively. NDISCL and NDISCTA represent non-discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the fitted values of Eq. 
(1a) and Eq. (1b), respectively. EQTA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. DTA is the ratio of deposits and short-term funds to 
total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. LGDPR is the logarithm of real gross domestic products. SHRATE is short-term 
interest rate proxied by the central bank policy rate. LEGAL is the stength of borrowers legal rights developed by the Doing Business 
database. Estimations are carried out using Panel Least Squares controlling for both cross-sectional and period fixed effects. *** 
indicates significant at the 1 percent level, while ** and * indicate significant at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 12. Loan loss provisions and loan growth for small bank sample 
Explanatory variables 
DLOAN LOANG DLOAN LOANG 
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
 
    
  
    
  DISCTA 0.0537 0.4058 0.0105 0.0381     
  NDISCTA -0.3532*** -2.8634 -0.6955*** -2.6839     
  DISCL     
  
-0.1626 -0.5680 -0.2189 -0.3574 
NDISCL     
  
-2.3166*** -6.0646 -4.1564*** -5.0061 
EQTA -0.1999 -1.4749 -0.6045* -1.9061 -0.1592 -1.1982 -0.4569 -1.4576 
DTA -0.0330 -0.3944 -0.0651 -0.3543 -0.0932 -1.1322 -0.1104 -0.6107 
SIZE 0.0543*** 3.0962 0.0811** 2.2364 0.0635*** 3.6761 0.0949*** 2.6373 
LGDPR -0.1528* -1.7803 -0.1936 -1.0881 -0.2132** -2.5305 -0.3021* -1.7147 
SHRATE -1.1078*** -4.9251 -2.2342*** -4.8611 -1.0835*** -4.9379 -2.2036*** -4.8772 
 
    
  
    
  Observations 817 
 
794 
 
816 
 
793 
 R-squared 0.4818   0.4147 
 
0.5069   0.4341 
 F-statistic 4.2992***   3.4533***   4.6425***   3.6533***   
Notes: DLOAN is the change in the ratio of total loans to total assets calculated from Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008). LOANG is the 
annual loan growth rate. DISCL and DISCTA represent discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the residuals of Eq. (1a) and 
Eq. (1b), respectively. NDISCL and NDISCTA represent non-discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the fitted values of Eq. 
(1a) and Eq. (1b), respectively. EQTA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. DTA is the ratio of deposits and short-term funds to 
total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. LGDPR is the logarithm of real gross domestic products. SHRATE is short-term 
interest rate proxied by the central bank policy rate. Estimations are carried out using Panel Least Squares controlling for both cross-
sectional and period fixed effects. *** indicates significant at the 1 percent level, while ** and * indicate significant at the 5 percent 
and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 13. Loan loss provisions and loan growth for small bank sample: Do private credit bureaus matter? 
Explanatory variables 
DLOAN LOANG DLOAN LOANG 
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
 
    
  
    
  DISCTA 0.1911 1.2811 0.2469 0.8601     
  NDISCTA -0.4462*** -3.3611 -0.8710*** -3.4622     
  DISCL     
  
0.2509 0.5589 0.8659 0.7837 
NDISCL     
  
-2.3364*** -4.7392 -4.1274*** -4.8387 
EQTA -0.1774 -1.2983 -0.5989 -1.6061 -0.1703 -0.8856 -0.4892 -1.3183 
DTA -0.0189 -0.2148 -0.0365 -0.1500 -0.0712 -0.6993 -0.0996 -0.4154 
SIZE 0.0606*** 3.4235 0.0920** 2.1408 0.0688*** 3.6111 0.1098*** 2.6252 
LGDPR -0.1363 -1.5463 -0.1672 -0.8863 -0.2000** -2.2930 -0.2986* -1.6629 
SHRATE -1.0856*** -4.8335 -2.1935*** -3.8738 -1.0751*** -4.7233 -2.1857*** -3.9874 
PRIVBUR 0.0309 1.1740 0.0526 0.8475 0.0259 1.1602 0.0367 0.6054 
DISCTA*PRIVBUR -1.4731** -2.0282 -2.7274* -1.8608     
  DISCL*PRIVBUR     
  
-1.8905** -2.3426 -4.9161** -2.5713 
 
    
  
    
  Observations 817 
 
794 
 
816 
 
793 
 R-squared 0.4844   0.4163 
 
0.5096   0.4389 
 F-statistic 4.3051***   3.4489***   4.6512***   3.6819***   
Notes: DLOAN is the change in the ratio of total loans to total assets calculated from Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008). LOANG is the 
annual loan growth rate. DISCL and DISCTA represent discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the residuals of Eq. (1a) and 
Eq. (1b), respectively. NDISCL and NDISCTA represent non-discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the fitted values of Eq. 
(1a) and Eq. (1b), respectively. EQTA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. DTA is the ratio of deposits and short-term funds to 
total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. LGDPR is the logarithm of real gross domestic products. SHRATE is short-term 
interest rate proxied by the central bank policy rate. PRIVBUR is the proportion of individuals and firms listed by a private credit 
bureau. Estimations are carried out using Panel Least Squares controlling for both cross-sectional and period fixed effects. *** 
indicates significant at the 1 percent level, while ** and * indicate significant at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 14. Loan loss provisions and loan growth for small bank sample: Do public credit registries matter? 
Explanatory variables 
DLOAN LOANG DLOAN LOANG 
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
 
    
  
    
  DISCTA -0.2113 -0.7748 -0.0201 -0.0345     
  NDISCTA -0.4558*** -2.9749 -0.7069** -2.1187     
  DISCL     
  
-0.4868* -1.7101 -0.7394 -0.8408 
NDISCL     
  
-2.3535*** -10.1207 -4.2152*** -6.8236 
EQTA -0.1905 -1.3890 -0.6130* -1.9035 -0.1630 -0.9884 -0.4728** -2.0979 
DTA -0.0346 -0.4119 -0.0640 -0.3471 -0.0907 -0.7138 -0.1095 -0.3849 
SIZE 0.0582*** 3.0802 0.0792** 2.0259 0.0646*** 3.2073 0.0945** 2.1791 
LGDPR -0.1527* -1.7779 -0.1939 -1.0879 -0.2114** -2.3798 -0.3103 -1.3569 
SHRATE -1.1046*** -4.9077 -2.2337*** -4.8511 -1.0823*** -3.3289 -2.1940*** -2.9573 
PUBREG -0.0235 -0.3013 0.0249 0.1539 -0.0025 -0.0274 0.0439 0.2198 
DISCTA*PUBREG 1.5881** 1.1326 0.1512 0.0499     
  DISCL*PUBREG     
  
3.2664** 1.8659 6.0932** 1.4283 
 
    
  
    
  Observations 817 
 
794 
 
816 
 
793 
 R-squared 0.4813   0.4126 
 
0.5073   0.4336 
 F-statistic 4.2633***   3.4116***   4.6177***   3.6250***   
Notes: DLOAN is the change in the ratio of total loans to total assets calculated from Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008). LOANG is the 
annual loan growth rate. DISCL and DISCTA represent discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the residuals of Eq. (1a) and 
Eq. (1b), respectively. NDISCL and NDISCTA represent non-discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the fitted values of Eq. 
(1a) and Eq. (1b), respectively. EQTA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. DTA is the ratio of deposits and short-term funds to 
total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. LGDPR is the logarithm of real gross domestic products. SHRATE is short-term 
interest rate proxied by the central bank policy rate. PUBREG is the proportion of individuals and firms listed by a public credit 
registry. Estimations are carried out using Panel Least Squares controlling for both cross-sectional and period fixed effects. *** 
indicates significant at the 1 percent level, while ** and * indicate significant at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 15. Loan loss provisions and loan growth for small bank sample: Do borrower legal rights matter? 
Explanatory variables 
DLOAN LOANG DLOAN LOANG 
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
 
    
  
    
  DISCTA 0.2292 0.3070 -2.2657 -1.1187     
  NDISCTA -0.3540*** -2.7741 -0.6109*** -2.6528     
  DISCL     
  
-2.9525*** -3.0522 -8.2554*** -2.9595 
NDISCL     
  
-2.3918*** -4.6287 -4.3927*** -4.7290 
EQTA -0.1924 -0.9151 -0.6332* -1.7061 -0.1120 -0.6141 -0.4933 -1.3875 
DTA -0.0373 -0.3773 -0.0526 -0.2213 -0.0834 -0.8668 -0.0892 -0.3987 
SIZE 0.0565*** 2.6917 0.0758* 1.7246 0.0596*** 2.9677 0.0852** 1.9941 
LGDPR -0.1742* -1.7416 -0.1327 -0.6646 -0.1762* -1.8119 -0.1837 -0.9499 
SHRATE -1.1234*** -4.5354 -2.1965*** -3.8244 -1.0807*** -4.6708 -2.1445*** -3.8691 
LEGAL 0.5606 0.3960 -0.7147 -0.2402 -0.3695 -0.2701 -2.2142 -0.7542 
DISCTA*LEGAL -3.3136 -0.2399 43.1925 1.1136     
  DISCL*LEGAL     
  
49.1530*** 3.0735 146.8840*** 2.6871 
 
    
  
    
  Observations 817   794   816   793   
R-squared 0.4803   0.4147 
 
0.5117   0.4423 
 F-statistic 4.2502***   3.4319   4.6820***   3.7189***   
Notes: DLOAN is the change in the ratio of total loans to total assets calculated from Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008). LOANG is the 
annual loan growth rate. DISCL and DISCTA represent discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the residuals of Eq. (1a) and 
Eq. (1b), respectively. NDISCL and NDISCTA represent non-discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the fitted values of Eq. 
(1a) and Eq. (1b), respectively. EQTA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. DTA is the ratio of deposits and short-term funds to 
total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. LGDPR is the logarithm of real gross domestic products. SHRATE is short-term 
interest rate proxied by the central bank policy rate. LEGAL is the stength of borrowers legal rights developed by the Doing Business 
database. Estimations are carried out using Panel Least Squares controlling for both cross-sectional and period fixed effects. *** 
indicates significant at the 1 percent level, while ** and * indicate significant at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
